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PD IEC TR 62351 — Power Systems Data and Communications Security Technical Reports
Power Systems Management and Associated Information Exchange — Data and Communications Security (BSI UK implementation)
🔐 PD IEC TR 62351 is the UK implementation, published by BSI, of a set of technical reports in the IEC 62351 series focused on data and communications security for power systems management and associated information exchange. The UK participation is entrusted to Technical Committee PEL/57 (Power systems management and associated information exchange). The three parts in this batch are: Part 10, security architecture guidelines; Part 12, resilience and security recommendations for power systems with distributed energy resources (DER) cyber-physical systems; and Part 13, guidelines on security topics to be covered in standards and specifications. Together they outline a complete framework for protecting smart-grid and power-communication networks, providing an important reference for the security design, standardisation, and operational practice of modern grids — especially those integrating large amounts of distributed generation and digital devices.
💡 As power systems evolve from traditional centralised grids to high-penetration renewable, distributed-resource, and digitally enabled smart grids, cybersecurity and communications security have become as important as primary-equipment safety. IEC 62351 is the series developed to address this trend.
1. Series Overview 📌
The IEC 62351 series provides security mechanisms for power-system automation, telecontrol, and protection communication protocols and applications — covering encryption, authentication, key management, and access control — and is widely regarded internationally as the “information-security cornerstone” of the electricity industry. It is developed by IEC/TC 57 (Power systems management and associated information exchange); BSI participates through committee PEL/57 and adopts the relevant parts as UK Published Documents.
The three parts here play different roles within the series: Part 10 gives a systemic approach to building a security architecture; Part 12 focuses on the emerging distributed-energy-resource scenario, analysing cyber-physical threats and resilience measures; and Part 13 guides standards writers on systematically covering security topics in standards and specifications.
2. Series Structure and Part Highlights 📋
| Part | Document Title | IEC Edition | Core Content |
|---|---|---|---|
| Part 10 | Security architecture guidelines | IEC/TR 62351-10:2012 (Ed. 1.0) | Security domain partitioning, system interface categories, security controls, and mapping to the TC 57 reference architecture |
| Part 12 | Resilience and security recommendations for power systems with distributed energy resources (DER) cyber-physical systems | IEC TR 62351-12:2016 (Ed. 1.0) | Five-level DER hierarchical architecture, DER system interfaces, cyber-physical threats and resilience measures, engineering and cyber threat analysis |
| Part 13 | Guidelines on security topics to be covered in standards and specifications | IEC TR 62351-13:2016 (Ed. 1.0) | Security requirements for users and applications, ICT cryptographic best practices, key management and multicast/group keys |
All three parts are classified under ICS 33.200 (Telecommunications in general) and published by BSI (PD IEC/TR 62351-10:2012 as a British Standard, the others as UK Published Documents). They are highly relevant in smart grid and power information security.
⚠️ These files are technical reports (TR) providing guidance, not mandatory requirements. When implementing cybersecurity, combine applicable legislation and regulatory requirements (e.g., EU NIS Directive, cybersecurity laws) and translate this guidance into concrete security policies and engineering designs.
3. Key Technical Requirements 🔧
1. Security Architecture Guidelines (Part 10)
Part 10 systematically describes how to build a security architecture in power systems, mainly covering:
- Power system security specifics and related standardisation: analysing the security needs unique to the electricity industry and surveying relevant regulation and standardisation activities;
- TC 57 reference architecture: introducing the IEC TC 57 reference architecture and mapping the security architecture to power system functional domains;
- Security domain mapping: defining security domains and mapping them to power system domains;
- System interface categories: classifying system interfaces and mapping them to power systems, defining the security protection boundary of each interface;
- Security controls: methods and key points for implementing security controls in power systems.
2. Resilience and Security Recommendations for DER (Part 12)
The large-scale integration of distributed energy resources (DER) makes power systems strongly cyber-physical: generation, storage, and load are deeply coupled with the information network. Part 12 analyses resilience challenges based on a “five-level DER hierarchical architecture”, covering:
- DER architectures and cyber-physical concepts: the resilience challenge for systems with DER, DER system interfaces, and resilience at different DER architectural levels;
- Protecting cyber-physical DER systems: cyber-physical threats, protection methods, and resilience measures;
- Threats, vulnerabilities, and impacts: distinguishing engineering and cyber threats, assessing their impact on power system resilience, and giving mitigation recommendations.
3. Security Topics in Standards and Specifications (Part 13)
Part 13 guides standard writers and system designers on systematically covering security topics in various documents:
- Security requirements for users and applications: risk assessment, security policies and requirements, plus user-focused cybersecurity procedures and techniques;
- ICT cryptographic techniques: best practices for specifying cryptography, cryptographic methods, and internet and wireless cryptography;
- Key management: public-key based key management, and management of multicast and group keys.
🚨 For power systems, security must be designed in, not bolted on: security domain partitioning, interface protection, and key management should be considered at the architecture design stage. Retrofitting later is costly and may never fully resolve the risk.
4. Engineering Practice Applications 🛠️
- 🏗️ Architecture planning: when building or upgrading grid automation and information management systems, use Part 10 to partition security domains and identify system interfaces, deploying access control, authentication, and monitoring at domain boundaries.
- 🔌 DER grid-connection management: when deploying distributed generation, storage, and controllable loads, assess cyber-physical threats per Part 12 and implement DER resilience and security measures to ensure grid stability at high penetration.
- 📝 Standards and procurement documents: when writing enterprise standards, technical specifications, and tender documents, use the Part 13 checklist to ensure cryptographic algorithms, key management, and security procedures are fully covered.
- 🛡️ Defence in depth: combine IEC 62351 with IEC 62443 (Industrial automation and control systems security) to build a layered, defence-in-depth approach protecting SCADA, telecontrol, and protection communications.
5. Frequently Asked Questions ❓
❓ Q: Is IEC 62351 mandatory?
A: The IEC 62351 series comprises international standards, technical specifications, and technical reports. The three parts here are technical reports providing guidance, not mandatory clauses. Implementation must comply with the laws and regulations of the relevant country or region.
A: The IEC 62351 series comprises international standards, technical specifications, and technical reports. The three parts here are technical reports providing guidance, not mandatory clauses. Implementation must comply with the laws and regulations of the relevant country or region.
❓ Q: What does “cyber-physical system” mean in Part 12?
A: It refers to a system where the information network is deeply coupled with physical devices (e.g., DER, storage, load). A cyber attack can propagate from the information layer to the physical layer, causing generation or supply interruption, so both engineering and cyber security must be considered together.
A: It refers to a system where the information network is deeply coupled with physical devices (e.g., DER, storage, load). A cyber attack can propagate from the information layer to the physical layer, causing generation or supply interruption, so both engineering and cyber security must be considered together.
❓ Q: What value does Part 13 provide to a practising engineer?
A: It gives a “security topics checklist” that helps engineers avoid omitting critical issues — cryptographic techniques, key management, risk assessment — when writing technical specifications, tender documents, and design schemes, improving completeness and implementability.
A: It gives a “security topics checklist” that helps engineers avoid omitting critical issues — cryptographic techniques, key management, risk assessment — when writing technical specifications, tender documents, and design schemes, improving completeness and implementability.
🔍 Q: How does it work with protocols such as IEC 60870 and IEC 61850?
A: IEC 60870-5-101/104 and IEC 61850 specify protocol implementation, while 62351 provides the security extensions (authentication and encryption). The two are deployed together in practice; see the relevant security extension documents (e.g., IEC TS 60870-5-7).
A: IEC 60870-5-101/104 and IEC 61850 specify protocol implementation, while 62351 provides the security extensions (authentication and encryption). The two are deployed together in practice; see the relevant security extension documents (e.g., IEC TS 60870-5-7).