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IEC TS 62668-2: Counterfeit Prevention for Avionics — Managing Electronic Components from Non-Franchised Sources
The avionics industry faces an escalating challenge: counterfeit, recycled, and fraudulent electronic components infiltrating supply chains, posing serious risks to flight safety, mission reliability, and regulatory compliance. IEC TS 62668-2 provides the definitive framework for managing this risk when components must be sourced from non-franchised distributors. As part of the IEC 62668 series on counterfeit prevention for process management in avionics, this Technical Specification establishes the derogation process, risk assessment methodology, and testing requirements that aerospace and defence organisations must follow to ensure that only authentic, reliable components enter flight-critical systems.
📋 1. Risk Framework and Procurement Classification
The standard establishes a comprehensive risk framework for evaluating and managing the procurement of electronic components from non-franchised sources. Key risk categories include:
| Risk Category | Description | Example Threats |
|---|---|---|
| Quality risks | Components may not meet OCM specifications | Incorrect grade/speed/temperature rating, out-of-spec electrical parameters |
| Reliability risks | Consumed useful life or latent defects | Previously used components with unknown thermal/electrical stress history |
| Industrial risks | Supply disruption or non-conforming product | Delayed delivery due to failed testing, inability to return non-conforming parts |
| Financial risks | Cost overruns due to rework or replacement | Cost of testing suspect parts, scrap of failed components, production delays |
| Legal risks | Intellectual property infringement | Unlicensed copies infringing OCM patents or trademarks |
Reasons to Initiate the Derogation Process
The standard recognises that purchasing from the original component manufacturer (OCM) or franchised distributors is always the preferred route. Derogation — purchasing from non-franchised sources — is permitted only under specific circumstances:
- Obsolescence notice failure: The OCM has issued an end-of-life notice and franchised inventory is exhausted.
- Allocation: The OCM cannot supply due to manufacturing allocation constraints.
- Insufficient end-of-life inventory: The OEM did not purchase sufficient lifetime buy quantities.
- Late orders: Components were not ordered within OCM order lead times.
- Minimum order quantity: The required quantity is below the OCM’s minimum order threshold.
- Technical requirements: The OCM no longer supports the required technology (e.g., obsolete process node).
⚠️ Critical Compliance Note: Derogation is NOT a routine procurement channel — it is an exception process that must be formally justified, documented, and approved for each procurement instance. Using non-franchised sources as a “first choice” for cost savings is explicitly non-compliant with IEC TS 62668-2 and may invalidate product liability insurance for ADHP applications. Each derogation request must pass through the full process including risk analysis, distributor qualification, testing, and records management.
🔬 2. Derogation Process and Testing Requirements
The standard defines a detailed 11-step derogation process, from initial notification through to failed component handling:
| Step | Activity | Key Deliverable |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Notification to OEM | Formal derogation request with justification |
| 2 | Analysis of alternative solutions | Alternatives assessment report |
| 3 | List of approved non-franchised distributors | Approved distributor list (ADL) |
| 4 | Non-franchised distributor consultation | Distributor capability questionnaire |
| 5 | Risk analysis | Procurement risk assessment (see Table 1 in standard) |
| 6 | Order authorization | Authorised derogation approval |
| 7 | Order processing | Purchase order with special conditions |
| 8 | Incoming inspection / testing | Test results and inspection records |
| 9 | Records | Traceability documentation |
| 10 | Storage and manufacturing handling | ESD and storage condition monitoring records |
| 11 | Failed component management | Failure analysis and corrective action reports |
Testing Requirements
The level of testing depends on the assessed procurement risk level. The standard provides detailed test methods based on SAE AS6171, including:
- External visual inspection: Examination for remarking, resurfacing, or damage on component packaging and body.
- X-ray inspection: Internal die detection — verification that the package contains the expected silicon die with correct markings.
- Scanning acoustic microscopy (SAM): Delamination detection — checks for internal cracks, delamination, or voiding.
- Decapsulation and chemical analysis: Die verification by removing encapsulation and examining the die markings and topology.
- Electrical parameter testing: ATE-based functional and parametric testing to verify performance matches the OCM data sheet.
- Solderability testing: Verification that terminations have not been excessively reprocessed or re-plated.
💡 Engineering Insight for Procurement Teams: The most cost-effective counterfeit mitigation strategy is to maintain an Approved Distributor List (ADL) with pre-qualified non-franchised sources BEFORE a procurement crisis occurs. The standard recommends establishing agreements with non-franchised distributors that require them to maintain traceability records, provide OCM certificates of conformance, and accept return of suspect components for laboratory analysis. Investing in ADL development during low-demand periods significantly reduces procurement cycle time when obsolescence or allocation emergencies arise.
⚙️ 3. Risk Assessment Methodology and Metrics
The standard introduces a structured risk assessment methodology that assigns risk levels to each procurement scenario:
| Scenario | Risk Level | Recommended Testing | Documentation Required |
|---|---|---|---|
| OCM direct purchase | None | None (OCM warranty applies) | OCM packing slip and CoC |
| Franchised distributor | Low | None (franchised warranty) | Franchise distributor CoC |
| Authorised aftermarket source | Low–Medium | Visual inspection + X-ray | Traceability documentation + test report |
| Approved non-franchised (obsolete parts) | Medium–High | Full suite per risk level (visual, X-ray, SAM, decapsulation, electrical test) | Full derogation file with risk assessment |
| Broker (unapproved source) | High | Full suite + additional tests (solderability, hermeticity as applicable) | Complete derogation file + OEM notification + customer approval |
✅ Best Practice Recommendation: Implement a closed-loop counterfeit prevention system that integrates IEC TS 62668-2 with your organisation’s existing quality management system (ISO 9001 / AS9100). The standard’s derogation process should be mapped to your enterprise resource planning (ERP) system so that purchase orders for non-franchised sources are automatically flagged and routed through the risk assessment workflow. This prevents unauthorised procurement from unapproved sources and ensures every derogation is documented with complete traceability. For high-reliability applications, consider implementing a component test laboratory with SAE AS6171 accredited methods in-house.
🔴 Critical Risk: The most dangerous counterfeit scenario is not obvious counterfeit products (poor markings, wrong packaging) but “high-quality” counterfeits that pass visual and X-ray inspection but contain the wrong silicon die — for example, a lower-specification commercial-grade die inside a military-grade marked package. This type of counterfeit can only be detected through electrical parameter testing at temperature extremes or through decapsulation and microscopic examination. Relying solely on external visual inspection and X-ray is insufficient for safety-critical avionics applications.
❓ Frequently Asked Questions
Q1: What is the difference between IEC TS 62668-1 and IEC TS 62668-2?
IEC TS 62668-1 covers the general counterfeit prevention framework for avionics — the overall process management system for avoiding counterfeit, fraudulent, and recycled electronic components. IEC TS 62668-2 specifically addresses the derogation process for sourcing from non-franchised distributors, providing the detailed step-by-step workflow, risk assessment methodology, and testing requirements that Part 1 references. Both parts are used together: Part 1 establishes the management system, and Part 2 provides the operational procedure for the specific case of non-franchised procurement.
Q2: Does the standard apply to all electronic components used in avionics?
The standard applies primarily to electronic components — integrated circuits, semiconductors, passive components, and hybrids — that are procured for use in aerospace, defence, and high-performance (ADHP) applications. Mechanical parts, raw materials, and software are outside the scope. However, the risk management principles can be adapted for other high-reliability procurement scenarios at the organisation’s discretion.
Q3: How does the standard address the challenge of components that are no longer manufactured?
This is precisely the main use case for the derogation process. When an OCM declares a component obsolete and franchised inventories are depleted, authorised aftermarket sources (who may have purchased remaining OCM inventory or obtained foundry rights) become the legitimate supply channel. The standard requires that these aftermarket sources be pre-qualified and maintained on the Approved Distributor List. Only when no authorised aftermarket source can supply should a broker or other non-franchised channel be considered.
Q4: Is this standard mandatory for civil aviation certification (EASA / FAA)?
IEC TS 62668-2 is not itself a regulatory requirement, but its principles are increasingly referenced in aviation safety regulations and advisory materials. EASA and FAA regulations require that components used in type-certificated products be traceable to OCM-approved sources. The standard provides a recognised methodology for demonstrating that risk-mitigated procurement from non-franchised sources meets an equivalent level of safety. Many aviation authorities accept compliance with IEC TS 62668-2 as evidence of an acceptable counterfeit prevention system under their quality system requirements (e.g., EASA Part 21, FAA AC 00-56).
