IEC TR 63167 — Cybersecurity Requirements for Electric Vehicle Charging Infrastructure

1. Introduction to IEC TR 63167

IEC TR 63167 provides a comprehensive technical report on cybersecurity requirements specifically tailored for electric vehicle (EV) charging infrastructure. As the global deployment of EV charging stations accelerates, these networked systems become attractive targets for cyberattacks that could disrupt grid operations, compromise user data, or even cause physical damage. This technical report establishes a structured framework for identifying cybersecurity threats, assessing risks, and implementing protective measures across the entire EV charging ecosystem.

IEC TR 63167 aligns with the broader IEC 62443 series for industrial communication network security, adapting its principles to the unique operational context of EV charging infrastructure where safety, availability, and data integrity are paramount.

2. Threat Landscape and Security Architecture

2.1 Attack Surface Analysis

Modern EV charging stations are complex cyber-physical systems incorporating payment processing, remote monitoring, over-the-air firmware updates, and grid communication interfaces. Each of these functional layers presents distinct vulnerabilities. The attack surface spans physical ports (USB, RFID readers), network interfaces (Wi-Fi, cellular, Ethernet), backend cloud platforms, and the communication links between the EV and the charging station (PLC ISO 15118). A compromised charging station could be weaponized to execute coordinated attacks on the power grid through load manipulation.

The convergence of information technology (IT) and operational technology (OT) in EV charging infrastructure creates unique security challenges. A breach in the IT payment system could cascade into OT systems controlling charging current, potentially causing grid instability.

2.2 Security Control Framework

IEC TR 63167 categorizes security controls into five domains: authentication and authorization, data encryption, network segmentation, incident response, and supply chain security. The report emphasizes defense-in-depth principles, requiring multiple independent layers of protection. For authentication, it mandates mutual TLS (mTLS) between charging stations and backend systems, and ISO 15118 plug-and-charge cryptographic certificates for EV-to-charger authentication. Data-in-transit encryption using TLS 1.3 is required for all external communications, while sensitive data-at-rest must be protected using hardware security modules (HSMs).

Security Domain	Control Measure	Implementation Requirement
Authentication	Mutual TLS + PKI Certificates	X.509 v3 certificates with 2048-bit RSA or ECC P-384
Encryption	TLS 1.3 for Data-in-Transit	AEAD ciphers (AES-256-GCM or ChaCha20-Poly1305)
Network Security	VLAN Segmentation + Firewall	Separate VLANs for OT, IT, and guest networks
Incident Response	Automated Anomaly Detection	ML-based behavioral analysis with < 5 min detection latency
Supply Chain	Secure Boot + Signed Firmware	Hardware root-of-trust with TPM 2.0

3. Engineering Design Insights

From an engineering perspective, implementing IEC TR 63167 requirements demands careful trade-off analysis between security rigor and operational performance. One critical design consideration is the selection of cryptographic algorithms that balance security strength with the computational constraints of embedded charging station controllers. Hardware acceleration for cryptographic operations should be prioritized at the architectural design stage rather than retrofitted. Another key insight is that secure boot chains must extend from the bootloader through the operating system kernel to the application layer, with each stage cryptographically verifying the next before execution. Engineers should also design for secure firmware update mechanisms that support rollback protection and atomic update operations to prevent bricked devices during failed updates.

Implementing a hardware root-of-trust using a dedicated secure element (e.g., TPM 2.0 or Infineon OPTIGA) at the design phase is significantly more cost-effective than adding security as an afterthought. This single architectural decision satisfies multiple IEC TR 63167 requirements simultaneously.

4. Frequently Asked Questions

Q1: How does IEC TR 63167 relate to ISO 15118?
A: ISO 15118 defines the communication protocol between EV and charging station including Plug & Charge security, while IEC TR 63167 addresses the broader cybersecurity architecture of the entire charging infrastructure, including backend systems, network infrastructure, and physical security.

Q2: What is the recommended approach for legacy charging station retrofits?
A: For existing installations, IEC TR 63167 recommends a risk-based phased approach, starting with network segmentation and encryption, followed by firmware hardening and access control upgrades during scheduled maintenance cycles.

Q3: Are there specific requirements for over-the-air (OTA) firmware updates?
A: Yes, the report mandates signed firmware images with code signing certificates, secure boot verification, rollback protection mechanisms, and atomic update procedures to ensure devices remain operational even if an update fails mid-process.

Q4: What key performance indicators (KPIs) should be monitored for cybersecurity effectiveness?
A: Recommended KPIs include mean time to detect (MTTD) anomalies, patch deployment latency, percentage of devices with security certificates expiring within 30 days, and number of blocked intrusion attempts per station per day.