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PD ISO IEC TR 15443 โ Information Technology Security Assurance Framework Technical Report Series (Introduction and Concepts / Analysis)
Information Technology โ Security Techniques โ Security Assurance Framework: Introduction and Concepts / Analysis (2012 Editions)
๐ PD ISO/IEC TR 15443 is the BSI-adopted ISO/IEC TR 15443 technical report series for information technology โ security techniques โ security assurance framework. The two parts in this batch are Part 1, which gives the introduction and concepts, and Part 2, which provides the analysis. Both are handled by BSI Technical Committee IST/33 (IT โ Security techniques), superseding the withdrawn PD ISO/IEC TR 15443-1:2005 and PD ISO/IEC TR 15443-2:2005. The series provides an authoritative framework for understanding the concepts, methods, and relationships of information security assurance, serving as a key reference for selecting evaluation methods, interpreting evaluation results, and building an assurance programme.
๐ก “Assurance” differs from “confidence”: assurance is inspectable, demonstrable evidence and activity, while confidence is a subjective judgement. This series helps security practitioners turn “I feel it is secure” into “it is secure with supporting evidence”.
1. Series Composition and Content Overview ๐
| Standard | Title | ISO/IEC Edition | Core Content |
|---|---|---|---|
| PD ISO/IEC TR 15443-1:2012 | Information technology โ Security techniques โ Security assurance framework โ Part 1: Introduction and concepts | ISO/IEC TR 15443-1 (Ed.2.0, 2012-11) | Security assurance concepts, assurance vs. confidence, the need for assurance, methods and relationships |
| PD ISO/IEC TR 15443-2:2012 | Information technology โ Security techniques โ Security assurance framework โ Part 2: Analysis | ISO/IEC TR 15443-2 (Ed.2.0, 2012-11) | Framework for the analysis of IT security assurance, SACA paradigms and selection criteria |
โ ๏ธ This series is a technical report (TR) providing guidance and background, not mandatory requirements; specific evaluation standards (e.g., ISO/IEC 15408 Common Criteria, ISO/IEC 27001 management systems) remain the direct basis for compliance and certification. This series helps explain the assurance logic behind them.
2. Part 1: Introduction and Concepts ๐ง
Part 1 establishes the conceptual foundation of security assurance:
- Definition of security assurance: the process and result of providing stakeholders with grounds for confidence, through evidence and argumentation, that a product, system, or service meets specified security properties.
- Assurance is distinguishable from confidence: assurance is argumentation based on objective evidence, while confidence is a subjective state; reliable confidence depends on assurance.
- The need for security assurance: why assurance is required in information security governance, procurement, and regulation, and the risks of its absence.
- Assurance methods and relationships: positioning of design evaluation, formal verification, penetration testing, and process evaluation, and how they relate.
This part gives readers a common vocabulary and mental framework for comparing assurance methods later.
3. Part 2: Analysis ๐
Part 2 provides a framework and criteria for analysing security assurance, helping practitioners choose a suitable assurance approach:
- Framework for the analysis of IT security assurance: establishes an execution framework for analysing assurance methods (SACA โ Security Assurance Consistency/Comparison paradigms and related approaches).
- Criteria for the analysis of SACA paradigms: gives criteria for comparing assurance paradigms, including:
- Availability of recognition agreements and arrangements: the degree of mutual recognition of evaluation results across countries/organisations.
- Geographical and political considerations: distribution of evaluation bodies, jurisdiction, and political sensitivity.
- Selection and decision support: trade-offs among assurance methods based on the criteria, guiding an organisation’s evaluation path.
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The practical value of this series is “methodology selection”: when an organisation must choose among Common Criteria evaluation, management-system certification, or development-process evaluation, the criteria in Part 2 help weigh cost, mutual recognition, and compliance requirements.
4. Summary of Key Technical Points ๐ง
| Topic | Key Content | Document |
|---|---|---|
| Assurance concept | Evidence-driven argumentation, assurance vs. confidence | 15443-1 |
| Need for assurance | Governance, procurement, regulatory needs | 15443-1 |
| Assurance methods | Positioning of evaluation, verification, testing, process evaluation | 15443-1 |
| Analysis framework | Execution framework for IT security assurance analysis | 15443-2 |
| Paradigm criteria | Recognition arrangements and geo-political factors | 15443-2 |
| Decision support | Selection and trade-offs among assurance methods | 15443-2 |
5. Engineering Practice ๐ ๏ธ
- ๐ Procurement decisions: when buying information security products, understand what terms such as CC evaluation assurance levels (EAL) mean within the assurance framework and select the assurance level that meets the need.
- ๐ง Evaluation path planning: use Part 2 criteria to trade off between CC evaluation, systems certification, and other methods, balancing cost and market access.
- ๐ Building an assurance programme: establish mechanisms for collecting, reviewing, and archiving assurance evidence within the organisation to support internal audit and external evaluation.
- ๐ Compliance communication: use the common vocabulary to explain the evidence basis of assurance conclusions to management, regulators, and customers.
6. Frequently Asked Questions โ
โ Q: What is “security assurance”?
A: Security assurance is the process and result of making stakeholders believe that a system or product meets specified security properties by collecting and analysing evidence and argumentation. It emphasises objectivity and verifiability, distinct from purely subjective confidence.
A: Security assurance is the process and result of making stakeholders believe that a system or product meets specified security properties by collecting and analysing evidence and argumentation. It emphasises objectivity and verifiability, distinct from purely subjective confidence.
โ Q: How does this series relate to ISO/IEC 15408 (Common Criteria)?
A: Common Criteria (CC) is a concrete product security evaluation standard defining evaluation assurance levels (EAL) and assurance components. This series is a “framework-level” technical report that helps understand the positioning, relationships, and selection logic of various assurance methods including CC, but does not replace CC itself.
A: Common Criteria (CC) is a concrete product security evaluation standard defining evaluation assurance levels (EAL) and assurance components. This series is a “framework-level” technical report that helps understand the positioning, relationships, and selection logic of various assurance methods including CC, but does not replace CC itself.
โ Q: What is SACA?
A: SACA refers to the consistency/comparison analysis of security assurance approaches (the exact expanded term should follow the standard text). Part 2 builds its analysis framework and selection criteria around such paradigms.
A: SACA refers to the consistency/comparison analysis of security assurance approaches (the exact expanded term should follow the standard text). Part 2 builds its analysis framework and selection criteria around such paradigms.
๐ Q: Why consider “recognition agreements” when selecting an assurance method?
A: In cross-border procurement and export scenarios, whether evaluation results are recognised by the target country directly affects market access. The more complete the recognition agreements and arrangements, the more widely a single evaluation can be used, reducing the cost and duration of duplicate evaluations.
A: In cross-border procurement and export scenarios, whether evaluation results are recognised by the target country directly affects market access. The more complete the recognition agreements and arrangements, the more widely a single evaluation can be used, reducing the cost and duration of duplicate evaluations.